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The doctrine of reciprocal trusts has been bandied about by
the courts, both tax and appellate. At its inception this doctrine
appeared to be both an efficient tax saving device and a con-
venient way to provide for the future of one's spouse all in
one package. This illusion was short-lived, for, at the very
outset, in the case of Lehman v. Commissioner,' some of the
beneficial features were taken out of this tax saving trust device.
No distinction was made between the tax-avoidance and bene-
ficial features of these trusts. The courts have continued through
recent years to deplete these trusts incorporating the doctrine
of the Lehman case.
It is our purpose to examine the Lehman doctrine and its
ramifications from its inception to the present, dwelling chiefly
on the recent developments in the field of reciprocal trusts,
2
and referring to the application of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954. It will be seen that while the tax courts were the primary
area for decision in reciprocal trust cases, recent developments
show an expansion into other fields.'
Simply stated, a typical reciprocal trust arises in the following
manner: A husband creates a trust, giving his wife a life estate
with power to alter, amend, or terminate, with the remainder
to his children, and with the wife and a bank as trustees. On
the same day the wife creates a similar trust giving a life estate
to her husband with the same powers as given her, with re-
mainder to the children, and with the husband and same bank
as trustees. If all the instruments considered in this field were
as simple as this, there would be little trouble in taxing them,
1 109 F2d 99 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 637 (1940).
2 For a detailed explanation of the historical development of the law of
reciprocal trusts, see Colgan and Molloy, Converse Trusts - The Rise and
Fall of a Tax Avoidance Device, 3 TAx L. REv. 271 (1948); Lyman, Reciprocal
Trusts in Estate and Gift Taxation, 42 CAur. L. REv. 151 (1954).
3 Security Trust Co. v. Sharp, 77 A.2d 543 (Del. Ch. 1950), see discussion
infra.
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but numerous variations4 present a like amount of problems.5
A large factor contributing to this variation is that the motives
and desires of the deceased must be gleaned from the instru-
ments themselves and the circumstances surrounding their cre-
ation.
Reciprocal Trusts and Taxation
EARLY DEVELOPMENTS Im THE TAX FIELD
The Lehman case6 is the keystone in the early history of this
doctrine. Every small segment of tax law seems to have its
model which sets up the particular field and lends its color to
all similar transactions. This situation has been present in refer-
ence to indirect benefits under a trust,7 amounts realized in sale
of property,8 and assigned renewal commissions of insurance
agents.9 In the field of reciprocal trusts it is the Lehman case
that prevails. Affecting only the field of estate tax at first, the
Lehman doctrine was extended to apply to both income and
gift tax cases. An examination of this case serves two purposes;
it gives an excellent example of these trusts apart from the all
too prevalent hypothetical situation; and it lays the foundation
for this discussion.
In 1930 the two Lehman brothers decided to create trusts
between themselves. They employed the same attorneys, used
the same form, invested the same amount of money and reserved
the same powers for each other, thereby creating in all respects,
identical trusts. Each brother created a trust for the other with
the net result that no one lost a thing. Each had just what he
started with, except that it was in a trust created by his brother.
4 This point is shown in the variety of names alone, which arise from
courts terming the instruments cross-trusts, Estate of Lindsay, 2 T.C. 174
(1943); parallel trusts, Estate of Bell, 46 B.T.A. 484 (1942), rev'd, 137 F.2d 454
(8th Cir. 1943); converse trusts, In re Perry's Estate, 111 N.J. Eq. 176, 162
Atl. 146 (1932); Siamese twins trusts, McArthur v. Faw, 183 Tern. 504, 193
S.W.2d 763, cert. denied, 329 U.S. 780 (1946); or reciprocal trusts, Hanauer's
Estate v. Commissioner, 149 F.2d 857 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S.
770 (1945).
5 "The issue is of the type, not unfamiliar in the law, where the dis-
tinctions are not-black and white, but of varying shades of gray and where
the shade chosen by a court will seem 'realistic' to him whose side wins and
artificial or fanciful to the other." Commissioner v. Dravo, 119 F.2d 97, 99
(3d Cir. 1941).
6 Lehman v. Commissioner, 109 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 310
U.S. 637 (1940).
7 Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940).
S Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
9 Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122 (1940).
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The court examined this system of cross-trust agreements and
held that since each was created upon the inducement of a
like trust being created in return, in effect, each was furnishing
the consideration for settling a trust for his own benefit. As
stated in Scott, Law of Trusts, "A person who furnishes the con-
sideration for the qreaton of a trust is the settlor, even though
in form the trust is created by another person."' 0 Since each
brother was the settlor he was not entitled to the rights and
privileges of an ordinary beneficiary. Looking through the form
to the substance the court invalidated this arrangement as a tax
avoidance scheme. In reaching this decision the coirt solved one
case but unfortunately opened the gates to many more question-
able decisions. Its greatest significance was that it laid down
the basic and still unchanged law of reciprocal trusts.
The Lehman doctrine's application in the field of estate tax
is its main area of development. Here the courts expanded the
scope of the doctrine by infeiring the prerequisites for its ap-
plication. In the Estate of Fish," trusts between' a husband and
wife, revocable only on agreement between the parties, were
held to be reciprocal as the grantor was actually reserving to
himself the resulting income. In Hanauer's Estate v. Commis-
sioner2 simultaneous identical trusts were held to be under the
Lehman doctrine on the basis of the wife's propensity. to. follow
her husband's footsteps in business matters. The doctrine was
stretched still further to apply in the Estate of Eckhardt.3 Though
the trusts were separately created, the court inferred from the
evidence that there must have been at least a tacit agreement
between the settlors because of their unusually intimate financial
and business relationship. These cases placed the burden upon
the administrators of the estates to rebut the inference that
reciprocity was present. A partial application of the Lehman
doctrine was present in Cole's Estate v. Commissioner," wherein
similar irrevocable trusts were created, the only difference being
the size of the corpus of each. The husband placed 700 shares
of stock in trust while the wife only settled 300 shares. The
court held that to the extent of 300 shares the trusts were recip-
rocal and taxable as such. These decisions, none of which show
bad intentions on the facts, as was the case with the Lehman
brothers, appear to be a far cry from the original intention of
the framers of the Lehman doctrine.
10 1 ScoTT, ThUsTS § 156.3 (1939).
"1 45 B.T.A. 120 (1941).
12 149 F.2d 857 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 770 (1945).
13 5 T.C. 673 (1945).
14 140 F.2d 636 (8th Cir. 1944).
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In three cases, the Lehman doctrine was held not to apply
to the facts as presented. The distinguishing factor in Commis-
sioner v. Dravo"' was that control of the trusts executed by
husband and wife was turned over to the trustees who had
the power to pay the income to the parties at their discretion,
and the motivating purpose of the settlors was the desire to re-
allocate the stock of a corporation in which they were principal
stockholders. In Estate of Lindsay'O the court, acting under a
set of facts similar to those in the Eckhardt case, 17 held that the
trusts were independent, and though created on the same day,
were motivated by separate causes. In the Eckhardt case the
court distinguished this case on the basis of the wife's dependence
upof her husband's business judgement. It would seem that
this would hardly qualify as a distinction anticipated to control
the application of the Lehman doctrine. Finally, in the case of
In re Lueders' Estate,8 the fact that the trusts were created
fifteen months apart prevented the appellate court from affirming
the tax court's finding of consideration from one to the other.
Though its origin was in the field of estate tax, the Lehman
doctrine soon appeared in the field of income tax also. In Purdon
Smith Whiteley, 19 identical trusts between brother and sister
were taxed under trust sections 166 and 167 of the Revenue Act
of 1932.20 The court held that the doctrine applied because what
one lost in one trust he gained by the other. In two later cases,
2 1
§§ 22 (a) and 22 (b) (2) ,'22 regarding gross income and annuity
rights were held to apply because, like the Lehman case, each
settlor was beneficiary for the trust he settled. In Hash v. Com-
missioner,23 the Lehman doctrine was extended to apply to trusts
created by parents, owners of stock in a family corporation,
where each spouse acted as co-trustee with the attorney, and
under the Clifford doctrine they retained the "bundle of rights."
2
15 119 F.2d 97 (3d Cir. 1941).
16 2 T.C. 174 (1943).
17 Estate of Eckhardt, 5 T.C. 673 (1945).
18 164 F.2d 128 (3d Cir. 1947).
19 42 B.T.A. 316 (1940).
20 Internal Revenue Code of 1939, §§ 166,167.
21 Werner A. Wieboldt, 5 T.C. 946 (1945); Moses L. Parshelsky, 46 B.T.A.
456 (1942), remanded, 135 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1943).
22 Revenue Act of 1938, §§ 22 (a), 22 (b) (2), 52 STAT. 457-58 (1938), see
discussion in Moses L. Parshelsky, 46 B.T.A. 456, 461 (1942).
23 152 F.2d 722 (4th Cir. 1945).
24 The "bundle of rights" doctrine, that is, the settlor's witholding of
rights in the trust though professing to relinquish them, and its relation to
the present case is fully discussed by the court in 152 F.2d at 724.
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In Welch v. Commissioner,25 the trusts were not taxable,
as there was no evidence in the record that the shares trans-
ferred to the wife were transferred in consideration of her mak-
ing the trust. The court did not apply the Lehman doctrine,
refusing to assume that such transfer was made in consideration
of the creation of the trust.
The Lehman doctrine drifted into the field of gift tax as it had
in the income tax field. Here two main decisions prevail. In
Commissioner v. Warner 2 each of three brothers created a trust
for another with the third as co-trustee with a common attorney.
The court held that each trust was created in consideration of
the other, thereby malting a gift from the real grantor not a
complete gift of the corpus. An attempt to evade the gift tax
by applying the Lehman doctrine was unsuccessful in Commis-
sioner v. McLean.2 The court held in reverse of its normal
position that the evidence did not show cross consideration suf-
ficient to rid the parties of their gift tax obligation.
It can be seen that the development of the Lehman doctrine
in these three tax fields has led to a widening of its scope to
an unforeseen extent. In attempting to apply this doctrine to
new fields the courts seem to get more interested in applying
the doctrine than finding the true intent of the parties, good
or bad as it may be.
REcENT DEVELOPMENTS iN THE TAX FmEw
The most recent case supporting the commissioner's charge
of reciprocity is Orvis v. Higgins.8 The appellate court held that
there was a "virtually irresistible inferenxce"2 9 of reciprocity
though the trial court had found the trusts to be independent.
An examination of the facts reveals a situation in which the in-
tent to create independent trusts is hard to deny, yet the court
of appeals did find that "reciprocity was intended."'2 0 In this case
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit that originated the
Lehman doctrine went to great lengths to make it applicable.
It is significant that the only justice on the bench when the
Lehman case was decided dissented in this case. If the facts
were significantly similar, the application of the Lehman doctrine
would be sound, but here it seems that the court has chosen
to ignore the lack of bad intention so basic to the doctrine's
25 8 T.C. 1139 (1947).
26 127 F.2d 913 (9th Cir. 1942).
27 127 F.2d 942 (5th Cir. 1942).
28 180 F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1950).
20 Id. at 540.
so Id. at 541.
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application, and find reciprocity when any possibility of such
a situation arises.
Two other recent cases have arrived at the opposite result,
finding that the trusts were created independently. In Newberry's
Estate31 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed
the tax court's finding of reciprocity, holding that the only
consideration in this case was the "historic 'consideration of love
and affection' for the dependent members of one's family.
'3 2
Refusing to apply the Lehman doctrine the court stated: 
The essential picture which the crossed trusts must reveal to justify
the result reached by the Tax Court in the present case is a declared
grantor induced to establish a trust giving the party now to be treated
for tax purposes as the grantor, a power which the latter has wanted
and has paid for by setting up another trust to accomplish something
desired by the declared grantor. Such in our view are the rather
strict confines of the Lehman doctrine.
This view seems to embody the true meaning of the Lehman
doctrine though it is accepted only by a minority of the courts.
It is this view in opposition to earlier concepts that accounts
for the split between the Second and Third Circuit Courts on
this problem.
A more recent case of independent trusts was Estate of Rux-
ton34 in which the husband, after long contemplation, created a
trust for his wife on the same day she created a like trust for
him. Holding the Lehman doctrine to be a concept of the court
and not a statutory provision made operative by the terms of
the instrument, the court stated,35 "That concept is based on
reason and analysis where the facts and circumstances of a par-
ticular case warrant going outside the formal terms of a trust
instrument and looking to the reality of the situation ... ." The
court seemed to be desirous of finding the true intention evident
in the situation rather than attempting to apply a doctrine.
These last cases present what we believe to be the most
acceptable application of the well established Lehman doctrine.
It is the interpretation of the intention of the parties that is
important38 and not the mere fact of actually furnishing the
z' Newberry's Estate v. Commissioner, 201 F.2d 874, (3d Cir. 1953).
s2 Id. at 877.
33 Ibid.
34 P-H. TAx COUaT SEarV. 7,20.66 (1953).
35 See below, note 36.
^6 "It cannot too strongly be emphasized that intention of the parties is
the touchstone of taxability. The full facts surrounding the creation of the
trusts may be brought forward to rebut any implication of mutual considera-
tion raised by coincidence of temporal identity of creation." Colgan and
Molloy, Converse Trusts - The Rise and Fall of a Tax Avoidance Device,
3 TAX L. Rzv. 271, 281 (1948).
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consideration. The Lehman doctrine was created to stop a present
wrong arising from the intentional design of two brothers to
evade taxes. Its application in many cases has gone far afield from
.this purpose. If this doctrine is to be clear and effective it must
be limited to its purposes, and not indiscriminately applied.3
The court in the Ruxton case put it this way: 
3 8
In our opinion, that doctrine should be applied only when clearly
warranted by the particular facts of a case considered in the light
of the decided cases.
The main reason for which the Lehman doctrine exists is to
prevent the intentional creation of reciprocal trusts for wrongful
purposes. The court in examining these family trusts should
diligently attempt to achieve this end by looking beyond the
trust to ferret out intentional wrongdoers, but at the same time
should refrain from invalidating trusts created in good faith. In
applying this judicial doctrine, attempts to protect the family
security should not prima facie be held to be schemes to defraud
creditors and avoid taxes because on their face they appear to
have been created in consideration of each other. The purposes
of the Lehman doctrine would be fulfilled if the trend evident
in the decisions of the Third Circuit would gain acceptance as
the general rule in cases of reciprocal trusts. By such an ac-
ceptance a more just and equitable application of a well founded
and established doctrine could be brought about in the tax field.
The body of this note was researched and written previous
to the enactment of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. A
thorough study of the pertinent sections of the new code reveal
that no direct cognizance was taken of this problem. While no
specific reference was made to reciprocal trusts therein it is of
course a possibility that the courts will continue to imply cov-
erage from one or another sections of the code. It is therefore
felt that the survey here presented is the law on the subject up
to and including the 1954 code. What the future may hold lies
in the realm of speculation.
Reciprocal Trusts and Involuntary Alienation
Following much the same lines evident in the early tax
decisions, one court has recently applied the Lehman doctrine
to involuntary and voluntary alienation. The rights of creditors
37 "I submit, however, that any blind or uncritical application of the
Lehman doctrine - or any doctrine that ignores proper legal form for the
purpose of limiting or obliterating economic facts - is likely to result in
unfairness and injustice." Callman, The Lehman Doctrine, Its Significance
and Application, 26 TAxEs 233 (1948).
38 P.H. TAX COURT SERv., 20.66 (1953).
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under reciprocal'trust agreements are intended to be contingent
upon clauses denying involuntary alienation of the funds in-
corporated in these trusts. In Security Trust Co. v. Sharp,9
the Delaware court considered a reciprocal trust and declared
that the fund was accessible to creditors and, though expressly
prohibited, assignable by the beneficiary. In this case, the
husband created a trust for his wife and she in turn created an
identical trust for him. Each trust contained clauses limiting
involuntary and voluntary alienation, which were invalidated by
the court. Regardless of what was professed, the true effect of
the trust was "considered" and the court held that such pro-
visions were not binding. The court stated that it did not matter
how the tax courts had treated this doctrine," but fitted the
reciprocal trusts into the same line of reasoning used therein.4
1
The court also placed this doctrine in the category of spendthrift
trusts indirectly created by the settlor for his own benefit, by
implying, that each party was the settlor of the trust for his own
benefit.
Because of well established precedent,42 the invalidating of
attempts to directly create spendthrift trusts presents no problem
to the courts. The difficult problem arises when it must be
decided who is the actual settlor or beneficiary. For the settlor-
beneficiary relationship to exist, ". . . it is not necessary that
the beneficiary shall have himself conveyed the property held
in trust .... of which he is the beneficiary or one of the bene-ficiaries. '1143
The rule adopted by the courts in this situation is clearly
seen in McArthur v. Faw.44 Two people placed corporate stock
in trust for each other to protect the fund from their creditors.
The court invalidated it on the basis of its being a spendthrift
trust created by each party for his own benefit and a protection
against his creditors. The rule was easily applied after establish-
ing the reciprocal relationship between the parties.
s9 77 A2d 543 (Del. Ch. 1950).
40 Id. at 547.
41 Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940); Lehman v. Commissioner,
109 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 637 (1940).
42 Bixby v. California Trust Co., 33 Cal2d 495, 202 P.2d 1018 (1949);
Wenzel v. Powder, 100 Md. 36, 59 Atl. 194 (1904); Jamison v. Mississippi
Valley Trust Co., 207 S. W. 788 (Mo. 1918); Schenck v. Barnes, 156 N.Y.
316, 50 N.E. 967 (1898); McArthur v. Faw, 183 Tenn. 504, 193 S.W.2d 763,
cert. denied, 329 U.S. 780 (1946); GRiswoLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRusTs 474 (2d ed.
1947); 1 RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 156 (1935).
43 1 RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 156, comment d (1935). "It is sufficient that he
paid the purchase price for a conveyance upon a trust ......
44 183 Tenn. 504, 193 S.W.2d 763, cert. denied, 329 U.S. 780 (1946).
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The intent of the parties is all too often neglected in these
cases. In some cases, where intent to defraud the creditors is
obvious from the facts,4 5 the courts' decisions seem justifiable.
In other cases, the rule seems rather harsh and arbitrary.46 An
excellent article by Costigan,47 supported by Griswold, 4 sug-
gests that there are situations in which bona fide trusts should
be allowed if justice is to be achieved though this view is not
adopted by the courts. One example of such a trust is where a
person is plainly solvent at the time of making the trust and only
wishes to prevent his own extravagance or the shrewd ways
of others from depriving him of an easier life in old age. Here
the "arbitrary" invalidation of such trusts seems unjust.
A similar situation would be presented where a husband
and wife create reciprocal trusts under similar circumstances.
Their only wish would be to take some excess funds in the prime
of life to secure an easier future for each other. It is unfair to
tell this man and his wife that they are defrauding people that
extend credit to them after they have created such trusts. To
grant the creditors the funds they are seeking, merely because
this relatioriship is found to exist, is too shortsighted. Since the
courts are ready to look at all the facts and circumstances to find
the real settlor they should also be ready to consider the actual
intention. This intention should govern the final iralidity of the
alienability clauses of the reciprocal trusts.
Following quite naturally from the conclusion that the credi-
tors could get at the trust fund, the case of Security Trust Co.
v. Sharp, decided that the restraint on voluntary alienation or
assignment of such funds should likewise be invalid.4 9 Since it
is concluded that the beneficiary created the trust, it necessarily
follows that he also must have created the restraints. After bein/g
deprived of the beneficial elements of the trust the continuance
of the burdensome features would not be just. As the court so
aptly stated, "I think it would be highly unequitable to insist that
he be bound by what are in reality self-imposed restraints. . . .,,"
It becomes clear that reciprocal trusts fit easily under the rules
in the settlor-beneficiary trust cases, in a majority of which
voluntary alienation has been allowed.- The close parallel be-
tween the two brings about the conclusion that the creator of
a reciprocal trust, like the settlor of a settlor-beneficiary spend-
45 State v. Nashville Trust Co., 28 Tenn. App. 388, 190 S.W.2d 785 (1944).
46 McColgan v. Walter Magee, Inc., 172 Cal. 182, 155 Pac. 995 (1916).
47 Costigan, Those Protective Trusts Which are Miscalled "Spendthrift
Trusts" Redxamined, 22 CALWr. L. Rlv. 471, 492 (1934).
48 GRIsWoL, SP .NwHIm TRUSTS 557 (2d ed. 1947).
49 77 A.2d 543, 545 (Del. Ch. 1950).
1o Id. at 547.
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thrift trust," .. .may voluntarily transfer his interest although
the terms of the trust contain an express restraint against his
voluntary alienation."52
Generally, any clause prohibiting voluntary alienation will
be linked with, and upheld or invalidated with, provisions pro-
hibiting involuntary alienation. Therefore they occupy only a
position of secondary importance in this consideration.
Conclusion
From the above consideration it is obvious that the courts have
not been able to apply the Lehman doctrine consistently in recip-
rocal trust cases. On the one hand, the broad application of a
formula, irrespective of the factual circumstances surrounding
the creation of the trusts, has been invoked; while on the other
hand, by taking into consideration the intent and good faith of
the creators the courts have applied what we consider the more
just view. If a consistently just rule is to be derived from the
various decisions, the courts must consider the intent of the
parties, the circumstances of their creation, and the real effect
of the trusts on all parties concerned. While it is true that
there may be intent to defraud the creditors or tax authorities
that is not generally the case. The courts in considering this
should refrain from assuming fraud merely because of the re-
ciprocal relationship. They should look to all the circumstances
and consequences as well as the good faith and good intent of
the creators. It is believed if this view is generally accepted the
resulting decisions in both the tax and alienation fields will bet-
ter reflect reality and bring about more consistently just and
equitable conclusions.
As previously mentioned the Internal Revenue Code of 1954
has not specifically dealt with reciprocal trusts. The judicial in-
terpretations of this code will decide in which cases its sections
will apply. We hope that this article will play a part in the ac-
ceptance of what we have presented as the more equitable ap-
plication of the code.
Robert J. Hepler
Donald W. Bebenek
51 Byrnes v. Commissioner, 110 F.2d 294 (3d Cir. 1940); McColgan v.
Walter Magee, Inc., 172 Cal. 182, 155 Pac. 995 (1916); Schenck v. Barnes,
156 N.Y. 316, 50 N.E. 967 (1898); City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Kennard, 1
N.Y.S. 2d 369 (Sup. Ct. 1937); In re Blake's Will, 266 App. Div. 580, 235 N.Y.
Supp. 324 (1st Dep't 1929). Contra: Hackley v. Littell, 150 Mich. 106, 113 N.W.
787 (1907).
52 1 REsTAmENT, TRUSTS § 156, comment e (1935).
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